ML Privacy Meter: Aiding Regulatory Compliance by Quantifying the
  Privacy Risks of Machine Learning by Murakonda, Sasi Kumar & Shokri, Reza
ML Privacy Meter: Aiding Regulatory Compliance by
Quantifying the Privacy Risks of Machine Learning∗
Sasi Kumar Murakonda, Reza Shokri
Data Privacy and Trustworthy ML Research Lab
National University of Singapore
{murakond,reza}@comp.nus.edu.sg
ABSTRACT
When building machine learning models using sensitive data,
organizations should ensure that the data processed in such
systems is adequately protected. For projects involving ma-
chine learning on personal data, Article 35 of the GDPR
mandates it to perform a Data Protection Impact Assess-
ment (DPIA). In addition to the threats of illegitimate ac-
cess to data through security breaches, machine learning
models pose an additional privacy risk to the data by indi-
rectly revealing about it through the model predictions and
parameters. Guidances released by the Information Com-
missioneraˆA˘Z´s Office (UK) and the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (US) emphasize on the threats to
data from models and recommend organizations to account
for and estimate these risks to comply with data protection
regulations. Hence, there is an immediate need for a tool
that can quantify the privacy risks to data from models.
In this paper, we focus on this indirect leakage about
training data from machine learning models. We present
ML Privacy Meter, a tool that can quantify the privacy risk
to data from models through state of the art membership
inference attack techniques. We discuss how this tool can
help practitioners in compliance with data protection regu-
lations, when deploying machine learning models.
1. DATA PRIVACY RISKS OF MACHINE
LEARNING MODELS
Organizations are collecting massive amounts of personal
information for building applications that are powered by
machine learning. This data, which is used to train the
models, typically contain sensitive information about indi-
viduals. Machine learning models encode information about
the datasets on which they are trained. The encoded infor-
mation is supposed to reflect the general patterns underly-
ing the population data. However, it is commonly observed
that these models memorize specific information about some
members of their training data [5] or be tricked to do so [10].
Models with high generalization gap as well as the mod-
els with high capacity (such as deep neural networks) are
more susceptible to memorizing data points from their train-
ing set. This is reflected in the predictions of the model,
which exhibits a different behavior on training data versus
test data, and in the model’s parameters which store sta-
tistically correlated information about specific data points
in their training set [9, 7]. This vulnerability of machine
∗Repository for the code and tutorials is available at https:
//github.com/privacytrustlab/ml_privacy_meter
learning models was shown using membership inference at-
tacks, where an attacker detects the presence of a particular
record in the training dataset of a model, just by observ-
ing the model. Machine learning models were shown to be
susceptible to these attacks in both the black-box [9] and
white-box settings [7].
In the black-box setting, we can only observe predictions
of the model. This setting models the scenario of machine
learning as a service offered on cloud platforms by companies
such as Amazon,1 Microsoft,2 and Google.3. It can be used
to measure the privacy risks against legitimate users of a
model who seek predictions on their queries. In the white-
box setting, we can also observe the parameters of the model.
This reflects the scenario where a model is outsourced to a
potentially untrusted server or to the cloud, or is shared with
an aggregator in the federated learning setting [6, 8]. The
privacy risks of machine learning models can be evaluated as
the accuracy of such inference attacks against their training
data.
2. DATA PROTECTION REGULATIONS
For a safe and secure use of machine learning models, it is
important to have a quantitative assessment of the privacy
risks of these models, and to make sure that they do not
reveal sensitive information about their training data. Data
protection regulations, such as GDPR, and AI governance
frameworks require personal data to be protected when used
in AI systems, and that the users have control over their data
and awareness about how it is being used.
For projects involving innovative technologies such as ma-
chine learning, it is mandatory from Article 35 of the GDPR
to perform a Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA).4
The key steps in DPIA are to identify the potential threats
to data and assess how they might affect individuals. In
general, risk assessment in DPIA statements focuses on the
risk of security breaches and illegitimate access to the data.
Machine learning models pose additional privacy risk to the
training data by indirectly revealing about it through the
model’s predictions and parameters. Hence, special atten-
tion needs to be paid for data protection rules in AI regula-
tion frameworks. Guidances released by both the European
Commission and the White House call for protection of per-
sonal data during all the phases of deploying AI systems and
1https://aws.amazon.com/machine-learning
2https://studio.azureml.net
3https://cloud.google.com/prediction
4https://gdpr-info.eu/art-35-gdpr/
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Figure 1: ML Privacy Meter is a python library that enables
quantifying the privacy risks of machine learning models to mem-
bers in the training dataset. The tool provides privacy risk scores
which help in identifying the data records that are under high risk
of being revealed through the model parameters or predictions.
build systems that are resistant to attacks [2, 3]. Recent re-
ports published by the Information CommissioneraˆA˘Z´s Of-
fice (ICO) for auditing AI [1] and the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) for securing applica-
tions of Artificial Intelligence [4] highlight the privacy risk
to data from machine learning models. And they specifically
mention membership inference as a confidentiality violation
and potential threat to the training data from models. It
is recommended in the auditing framework by ICO for or-
ganizations to identify these threats and take measures to
minimize the risk [1]. As the ICOaˆA˘Z´s investigation teams
will be using this framework to assess the compliance with
data protection laws, organizations must account for and
estimate the privacy risks to data through models.
3. ML PRIVACY METER
A tool that can automatically assess the privacy risks
of machine learning models to their training data can aid
practitioners in compliance with data protection regulations.
But how do we measure the risk of indirect information leak-
age about training data from complex ML models? We
present ML Privacy Meter that can quantify the privacy
risks to training data and is based on well-established algo-
rithms to measure privacy risks of machine learning models
through membership inference attacks [7, 9]. The tool pro-
vides privacy risk scores that help in identifying the data
records that are under high risk of being revealed through
the model parameters or predictions. The tool can generate
extensive privacy reports about the aggregate and individ-
ual risk for data records in the training set at multiple levels
of access to the model. It can estimate the amount of in-
formation that can be revealed through the predictions of a
model (referred to as Black-box access) and through both
the predictions and parameters of a model (referred to as
White-box access). Hence, when providing query access to
the model or revealing the entire model, the tool can be used
to assess the potential threats to training data.
ML Privacy Meter works by implementing membership
inference attacks against machine learning models. It simu-
lates attackers with different levels of access and knowledge
about the model. It considers attackers who can exploit
Figure 2: ML Privacy Meter quantifies the privacy risk to train-
ing data from machine learning models. The risk is measured
through success of membership inference attacks quantified by
an ROC curve representing the trade-off between true positive
and false positive rates. It also allows for comparison of privacy
risk across records from different classes.
only the predictions of the model, the loss values, and the
parameters of the model. For each of the simulated attacks,
the tool reports risk scores for all the data records. These
scores represent the attackeraˆA˘Z´s belief that the record was
part of the training dataset. The larger the gap between
the distribution of these scores for records that are in the
training set versus records that are not in the training set,
the larger is the leakage from the model would be.
Success of the attacker can be quantified by an ROC curve
representing the trade-off between False Positive Rate and
True Positive Rate of the attacker. True positive represents
correctly identifying a member as present in the data and
False positive refers to identifying a non-member as mem-
ber. An attack is successful if it can achieve larger values of
True Positive rate at small values of False Positive rate. A
trivial attack such as random guess can achieve equal True
Positive and False Positive Rates. ML Privacy Meter auto-
matically plots the trade-offs that are achieved by our simu-
lated attackers. The area under those curves quantifies the
aggregate privacy risk to the data posed by the model. The
higher the area under curve, larger the risk. These numbers
not only quantify the success of membership inference at-
tacks, but they can also be seen as a measure of information
leakage from the model.
When deploying machine learning models, this quantifica-
tion of risk can be useful while performing a Data Protection
Impact Assessment. The aim of doing a DPIA is to analyze,
identify and minimize the potential threats to data. ML pri-
vacy meter can guide practitioners in all the three steps. It
can help in estimating the privacy risk to data and to iden-
tify the potential causes of this risk. It can also be useful
in selecting and deploying appropriate risk mitigation mea-
sures.
The tool produces detailed privacy reports for the training
data. It allows comparing the risk across records from differ-
ent classes in the data. We can also compare the risk posed
by providing black box access to the model with the risk due
to white box access. As the tool can immediately measure
the privacy risks for training data, practitioners can take
simple actions such as finetuning their regularization tech-
niques, sub-sampling, re-sampling their data, etc., to reduce
the privacy risk. Or they can even choose to learn with a
privacy protection, such as differential privacy, in place.
Differential Privacy is a cryptographic notion of privacy,
wherein the outputs of a computation should be indistin-
guishable when any single record in the data is modified.
The level of indistinguishability is controlled by a privacy
parameter . Open source tools such as OpenDP 5 and Ten-
sorFlow Privacy 6 are available for training models with dif-
ferential privacy guarantees. Selecting an appropriate value
for  is highly non-trivial when using these tools. Models
learned with smaller value of  provide better privacy guar-
antees but are also less accurate.  represents a worst case
upper bound on the privacy risk and the practical risk might
be much lower. ML Privacy Meter can help in the selection
of privacy parameters () for differential privacy by quanti-
fying the risk posed at each value of epsilon. Compared to
just relying on the guarantees provided by epsilon, using this
method helps in deploying models with higher accuracy. By
letting practitioners choose models with better utility, ML
Privacy Meter can enable the use of privacy risk minimiza-
tion techniques.
4. SUMMARY
By leaking information through predictions and param-
eters, machine learning models pose an additional privacy
risk to data in AI systems. To comply with data protection
regulations, we need to assess these risks and take possible
mitigation measures. ML Privacy Meter quantifies the pri-
vacy risk of machine learning models to their training data.
It can guide practitioners in regulatory compliance by help-
ing them analyze, identify, and minimize the threats to data.
By permitting for deploying models with better accuracy,
through practical estimates of utility-privacy trade-offs, we
expect the tool to boost adaptation of privacy enhancing
techniques in machine learning.
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